The Website of Carlos Whitlock Porter

In my article “WAR CRIMES TRIALS”, I said that the 10,000 “war crimes trials” held since WWII have had little or no basis in law; that this is clear from the wording of the treaties which are said to have been violated; that the European and Asian resistance movements were illegal; and that the ‘collaborators’ shot, hanged, or imprisoned after WWII were acting in compliance with international law.

The truth of the above is apparent, not only from the provisions of the treaties said to have been violated, but from many, perhaps all, the recognized and prestigious texts on international law published between ratification of the various Hague Conventions and 1945.

The fact of the matter is, that the Allied victors of WWII stood international law on its head in 1945 by charging the defeated powers, not merely for “crimes” which never existed in pre-1945 international law at all – such as “willing membership in a conspiracy or common plan” to commit “crimes against humanity”, “crimes against peace”, “planning, preparations and waging of aggressive war”, etc., etc., but for actions which were PERFECTLY LEGAL UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW AS IT EXISTED IN 1945.

Generally, the words “war crime” and “war criminal”, in traditional pre-1945 international law, referred to the actions of resistance movements and so-called “war treason”, i.e, any action taken by a resident or citizen of an occupied country harmful to the interests of the military occupant.

To a lesser extent, “war crimes” also referred to illegal actions performed on the battlefield by combat troops; various lists are given of between 10 and 20 offences, for example, poisoning wells, abuse of a flag of truce, feigning death so as to kill by treachery, etc. etc.

These latter actions have very little relevance by comparison, and some of them even appear to have been an Allied speciality (in particular, employing assassins, bombarding civilians for purposes of terrorizing the population, the destruction of cultural monuments, robbing prisoners of war of their valuables, abrogating the Geneva Convention in Eisenhower’s “Death Camps”, etc.).

The following are a few quotations on the subject only.

The index to WAR RIGHTS ON LAND, by J.M. Spaight, LL.D., Macmillan and Co., Ltd, London, 1911, a classic of international law, contains no mention of the world “Trial” “War crimes trials” or “War crimes trials”. “Punishment of offenders against the laws of war” is discussed on 462. “War treason” is discussed on p. 333-5.

Page 333-5: “If the inhabitants of an occupied territory do not owe allegiance to the occupying belligerent, they do owe him the duty of quiescence and of abstention from every action which might endanger his safety or success. They are subject to his martial law regulations, and they may be judged guilty of ‘war treason’ under certain circumstances. ‘War treason’ (Kriegsverrath) [sic] is distinguished from rebellion (which is the actual taking up of arms) and is thus defined in the German Manual:

“The act of damaging or imperilling the enemy’s power by deceit, or by the transmission of messages to the national army on the subject of the position, movements, plans, etc., of the occupant, irrespectively of whether the means by which the sender has come into possession of the information be legitimate or illegitimate’ (e.g., by espionage). The French jurist, Professor Bonfils, points out that it is quite immaterial what the motives of the war-traitor are – whether patriotic and noble or base and mercenary – and how he has come by the information he conveys; for these things do not affect the danger to the invading army. So far as touches the latter, it is an act of perfidy when a person who has been respected as a non-combatant abuses his position to render secret aid to his national forces [footnote omitted].

“[…] In an occupied country a certain law runs, and that law receives its sanction from the occupying belligerent. He may keep the former Government’s laws in force, but still they are, during occupation, the laws of the new ruler, who is alone able to enforce them, and who might abrogate them if he chose. […] Today, treason means a conspiracy against the established authority in a State. Now, the established authority in an occupied territory is the de facto ruler, the occupant. If one likes the phrase, he is the ‘war ruler’, and it is ‘war treason’ to conspire against the ‘war ruler’. No jurist would deny the occupant’s right to deal summarily with an individual who, having been treated as a non-combatant, abused his immunity by sniping the enemy’s foragers or stragglers; and the damage done by one individual sniper would probably be infinitely less than that done by sending messages to the national army. Either act is clearly one which the occupant must, for his security’s sake, punish rigorously; not because either is morally wrong, but because it is dangerous. But any way, if one compares the two acts from the view-point of morality, less moral blame would appear to attach to the man who takes rifle in hand than to him who pretends to accept the occupant’s authority while all the time he is sending secret messages to the other commander. Although no mention of war treason is made in the British Official Manual, as it is in the French, German, and American manuals, the offence is referred to in the Circular Memorandum issued by Lord Kitchener on 2nd May 1900, relative to martial law in the Orange Free State…”

INTERNATIONAL LAW, A TREATISE, by L. Oppenheim, M.A., LL.D., Vol. II, DISPUTES, WAR AND NEUTRALITY, Fifth Edition, Edited by H. Lauterpacht, LL.D., Dr. Jur., Dr. Sc. Pol, published by Longmans, Green, & Co., London, New York, Toronto, September 1935, discusses “War crimes” on pp. 177, 178, 211, 219, 221, 337, and 460, stating “See also WAR TREASON”. The index continues: “Conception of, 452, 456-461, effects of peace on, 481, superior orders, defence of, 196, 454, violation of capitulations and simple surrender, 432, 433. “Punishment” and “trial” do not appear in the index. “War treason” is discussed on pp. 404, 456, and 457. “Distinguished from real treason” appears on p. 339, “list of kinds of” appears on pp. 458 and 459.

Page 177: “Owing to their position, it is inevitable that he [the occupant] should consider and mark as criminals such of them [the civilian population] as commit hostile acts, although they may be inspired by patriotic motives, and may be highly praised for their acts by their compatriots. According to a generally recognised customary rule of International Law, hostile acts on the part of private individuals are not acts of legitimate warfare, and the offenders may be treated and punished as war criminals. Even those writers [footnote omitted] who object to the term ‘criminals’ do not deny that such hostile acts by private individuals, in contradistinction to hostile acts by members of the armed forces, may be severely punished. The controversy whether or not such acts may be styled ‘crimes’ is again only one of terminology; materially, the rule is not at all controverted [footnote omitted].”

Page 219: “Section 85. In a sense, the crews of merchantmen owned by subjects of a belligerent belong to its armed forces. For these vessels are liable to be seized by enemy men-of-war, and, if attacked for that purpose, they may defend [footnote omitted] themselves, may return the attack, and eventually seize the attacking men-of-war. The crews of merchantmen become in such cases combatants, and enjoy all the privileges of the members of armed forces. But unless attacked, they must not commit hostilities, and if they do so, they are liable to be treated as criminals, just as private individuals who commit hostilities in land warfare.”

Page 404: “Section 210. Espionage and war treason do not play so large a part in sea warfare as in land warfare, but they may be employed. Since the Hague Regulations deal only with land warfare, there is no legal necessity for trying a spy in sea warfare by court-martial according to Article 30, although this is advisable.”

“Section 253: Violations of rules regarding rules of warfare are war crimes only when committed without an order of the belligerent Government concerned. If members of the armed forces commit violations by order of their Government, they are not war criminals, and may not be punished
[excerpt from footnote:

“… The contrary is sometimes asserted [extensive references omitted] But [extensive list of authorities omitted] agree with the view expressed in the text. The law cannot require an individual to be punished for an act which he was compelled by law to commit…”

“by the enemy; the latter may, however, resort to reprisals. In case members of forces commit violations ordered by their commanders, the members may not be punished, for the commanders are alone responsible, and the latter may, therefore, be punished as war criminals on their capture by the enemy [footnote omitted].
“The following are the more important violations that may occur:
(1) Making use of poisoned, or otherwise forbidden, arms and ammunition, including asphyxiating, poisonous, and similar gases.
(2) Killing and wounding soldiers disabled by sickness or wounds, or who have laid down arms and surrendered.
(3) Assassination, and hiring of assassins.
(4) Treacherous request for quarter, or treacherous feigning of sickness and wounds.
(5) Ill-treatment of prisoners of war, or of the wounded and sick. Appropriation of such of their money and valuables as are not public property.
(6) Killing or attacking harmless private enemy individuals. Unjustified appropriation and destruction of their private property, appropriation and destruction of their private property, and especially pillaging. Compelling the population of occupied territory to furnish information about the army of the other belligerent, or about his means of defence.
(7) Disgraceful treatment of dead bodies on battlefields. Appropriation of such money and other valuables found upon dead bodies as are not public property or arms, ammunition, and the like.
(8) Appropriation and destruction of property belonging to museums, hospitals, churches, schools, and the like.
(9) Assault, siege, and bombardment of undefended open towns and other habitations. Unjustified bombardment of undefended places by naval forces. Aerial bombardment for the sake of terrorising or attacking the civilian population.
(10) Unnecessary bombardment of historical monuments, and of such hospitals and buildings devoted to religion, art, science, and charity as are indicated by particular signs notified to the besiegers bombarding a defended town.
(11) Violations of the Geneva Conventions
(12) Attack on, or sinking of, enemy vessels which have hauled down their flags as a sign of surrender. Attack on enemy merchantmen without previous request to submit to visit.
(13) Attack or seizure of hospital ships, and all other violations of the Hague Convention for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention.
(14) Unjustified destruction of enemy prizes [footnote omitted].
(15) Use of enemy uniforms and the like during battle; use of the enemy flag during attack by a belligerent vessel.
(16) Attack on enemy individuals furnished with passports or safe-conducts; violation of safeguards.
(17) Attack on bearers of flags of truce.
(18) Abuse of the protection granted to flags of truce.
(19) Violation of cartels, capitulations and armistices.
(20) Breach of parole [footnote omitted].
“Hostilities in Arms by private individuals.

“Section 254. Since International Law is a law between States only and exclusively, no rules of International Law can exist to prohibit private individuals from taking up arms, and committing hostilities against the enemy. But private individuals committing such acts do not enjoy the privileges of members of armed forces, and the enemy has, according to a customary rule of International Law, the right to consider, and punish, such individuals as war criminals. Hostilities in arms committed by private individuals are war crimes, not because they are really crimes, but because the enemy has the right to consider and punish them as acts of illegitimate warfare. The conflict between praiseworthy patriotism on the part of such individuals and the safety of the enemy troops does not allow of any solution. It would be unreasonable for International Law to impose upon a belligerent a duty to forbid the taking up of arms by his private subjects, because such action may occasionally be of the greatest value to him, especially for the purpose of freeing a country from the enemy who has militarily occupied it. Nevertheless, the safety of his troops compels the enemy to consider and punish such hostilities as acts of illegitimate warfare, and International Law gives him a right to do so…
It must be particularly noted that a merchantman of a belligerent, which attacks enemy vessels without previously having been attacked by them, may be considered as a pirate [footnote omitted], and that the captain, officers, and members of the crew may, therefore be punished as war criminals to the same extent as private individuals who commit hostilities in land warfare [footnote omitted].
Section 255. Espionage and war treason, as has been explained above [footnote omitted], bear a twofold character. International Law gives a right to belligerents to use them.”

“The following are the chief cases of war treason that may occur:
(1) Information of any kind given to the enemy.
(2) Voluntary supply of money, provisions, ammunition, horses, clothing, and the like, to the enemy.
(3) Any voluntary assistance to the military operations of the enemy, be it as serving as guide in the country, by opening the door of a defended habitation, by repairing a destroyed bridge, or otherwise.
(4) Attempting to induce soldiers to desert, to surrender, to serve as spies, and the like; negotiating desertion, surrender, and espionage offered by soldiers.
(5) Attempting to bribe soldiers or officials in the interest of the enemy, and negotiating such bribe.
(6) Liberation of enemy prisoners of war [footnote omitted];
(7) Conspiracy against the armed forces, or against individual officers and members of them.
(8) Wrecking of military trains, destruction of the lines of communication or of telegraphs or telephones in the interest of the enemy, and destruction of any kind of war material for the same purpose.
(9) Circulation of enemy proclamations dangerous to the interests of the belligerent concerned [footnote omitted].
(10) Intentional false guidance of troops by a hired guide, or by one who offered his services voluntarily.
(11) Rendering courier, or similar, services to the enemy.

“Section 257. All war crimes may be punished [footnote omitted] with death, but belligerents may, of course, inflict a more lenient punishment, or commute a sentence of death into a more lenient penalty. If this be done and imprisonment take the place of capital punishment, the question arises whether persons so imprisoned must be released at the end of the war, although their term of imprisonment has not yet expired. Some [footnote omitted] answer this question in the affirmative, maintaining that it could never be lawful to inflict a penalty extending beyond the duration of the war. But it is believed that the question has to be answered in the negative. If a belligerent has a right to pronounce a sentence of capital punishment, it is obvious that he may select a more lenient penalty and carry it out beyond the duration of the war. It would in no wise be in the interest of humanity to deny this right, for otherwise belligerents would be tempted always to pronounce and carry out a sentence of capital punishment in the interest of self-preservation.”

“War crimes: Infringements of this martial law are regarded as ‘war crimes’ . As a rule, no penalty should be inflicted on offenders without previous inquiry and condemnation by a court-martial consisting of a number of officers convened for the purpose [COMMENT: Note that public trial is not a requirement]. German authorities [COMMENT: and British authorities as well; see above] speak also of a special kind of war crime, which they call ‘war treason’ (‘Kriegsverrath’) [sic]. The German Manual defines it as the act of injuring or endangering the belligerent’s interests by deceit, or by sending messages to the opposing army with regard to the position, movements, plans, etc. of the belligerent, whether in the field or in occupation [footnote omitted]. The use of the expression ‘war treason’ as applied to the nationals of the enemy is, in certain respects, unjustifiable; but, whatever terminology be adopted, the consequences of the offence are the same. Thus certain acts committed openly by members of the enemy’s armed forces are legitimate, but are regarded as acts of ‘war treason’ if attempted or done in occupied territory or within the belligerent’s lines, either by enemy civilians or by enemy soldiers in disguise. Between these acts, and those which are sometimes styled ‘war crimes’, there is really no essential basis of distinction, either in logic or in practice, and it would be as well if the simpler term ‘war crime’ were alone used, instead of an offensive term which implies, from its ordinary use, moral obliquity. Examples [footnote omitted] of such acts are the destruction of military stores, bridges, lines of communication, telegraphs, or telephones, or electric works; wrecking military trains; cutting off water supply; setting free captured colleagues; supplying information to the enemy; misleading the belligerent’s forces when acting as guides; voluntarily aiding the enemy by gifts of money or supplies or information; damage to or alteration of military signposts and notices; fouling sources of water supply; and concealing animals, vehicles, supplies, and fuel in the interest of the enemy; conspiracy against belligerent authority; opposition to requisitions; possessing arms; entering prohibited places; stealing belligerent property; photographing without authority; bribing the belligerent’s forces to surrender or desert; circulating proclamations or making promises calculated to imperil or damage the belligerent, etc. […] War crimes of all kinds may be punished by death, and there is something to be said for the view that lesser penalties may include imprisonment extending beyond the duration of the war [footnote refers to Oppenheim, chapter II, Section 257]. […]

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