(From the North German Gazette of December 2, 1914)

   Further proofs have been found that
England, in co-operation with Belgium, had prepared the war against Germany already during peace time to the utmost, not only in a diplomatic but also in a military way. Recently, our troops seized some secret military guide-books about Belgium, edited by the British General Army Staff, entitled: "Belgium, Road and River Reports, prepared by the General Staff, War Office."

We are in possession of four volumes of this handbook, of which volume 1 was printed in 1912, volume 2 in 1913, volume 3 (in two parts) and volume 4 in 1914.

They show the following imprint: "Confidential. This book is the property of the British Government and is to be used for the personal information of who himself is responsible for the safe keeping of the book. The contents are to be revealed to authorized persons only."

The handbook contains evidences of military investigations in the minutest and most exact descriptions of the territory. The introduction reads as follows: "These reports can give only the condition of the roads at the time in which they were investigated. It will always be advis-




able to investigate them again before they are used, in order to make sure that they are not closed on account of repairs, pipe laying," etc.

Thus, for instance, in volume 1, page 130 and following, the great highroad, Nieuport-Dixmude-Ypres-Menin-Tourcoing-Tournai, is described and accompanied by maps, with special regard to quality of the roads, the surrounding country, tactic considerations, observation posts and water conditions. In this discussion all the villages along the highroad are enumerated and described. Thus we find their exact distance from one another, detailed descriptions of the road net, with reference to elevations, bridges, crossings, telephone and telegraph stations, railway stations, including length of platforms and landing places; branch lines, oil tanks, etc. It is always mentioned whether the population speaks partly or altogether French.

As an illustration we may cite the tactical remarks about Dixmude on page 151:


It will be difficult to take Dixmude from the north or from the south. The best position for defense against attacks from the south would be the railway embankment in the west as far as the street, to the east a number of small hills. As far as 1,500 yards west of the street the field is favorable for firing; farther to the east the view is obstructed by trees. Two battalions would be sufficient for occupation. The hostile artillery probably would be situated near Hoogmolen and Vertkant; otherwise there is nothing of tactical importance, nor is there anything which might retard marching. Point of observation, the mill of Reencheek permitting of a free panoramic view; also the Koelberg, seven and one-half miles distant from Ypres, with outlook toward the east and south.

It may be mentioned that the church towers are usually mentioned as good observation points.



In a similar detailed manner the entire course of the Scheldt, with all tributaries, villages, landings, opportunities for crossing, widths and depths, bridges, supply of boats, etc., is described.

Thus the handbooks form an excellent guide for the army leader, the officer of the general staff and for officers second in command. To the book are added:

First—A schedule containing information about communities and villages for purposes of billeting; furthermore, instructions regarding transportation and all other items which may be needed by the local commander.

Second—A number of important hints to aviators for that part of Belgium which is situated south of the line Charleroi-Namur-Liege as well as for the surroundings of Brussels.

This very carefully and comprehensively drawn memorandum is supplemented by a map showing the landing places. It bears the inscription "Secret" and is dated July, 1914.

These military geographical handbooks cannot be supposed to have been written shortly before or during the war. That would, aside from putting them in print, have been impossible. The material for the work has, on the contrary, as may be seen from remarks in the different parts, been collected since 1909. The first volume was printed in 1912.

The manuals therefore prove a minute preparation carried on during the last five years for an English campaign in neutral Belgium. They are nothing else but secret regulations of military service for an English army fighting in Belgium. The English general staff therefore since long time prepared themselves for this event and foresaw the same so surely that they undertook the painstaking work of compiling these military handbooks.

Without ready and far-reaching assistance on the part of




the Belgian government and military authorities such a work would not have been possible. Those strategical and tactical reports, going into the minutest details, as mentioned above, or such exact data concerning railroads and transportation service, rolling stock, locks And bridges, could not have been obtained in any other way. The schedules about the billeting capacity, which deal with Belgium as if it were English territory, could only be derived from the Belgian government. Without doubt official Belgium material has been used. It is made suitable for English purposes or at many places simply translated into English!

Very extensively, indeed, England and Belgium had prepared themselves together during times of peace for military co-operation. Belgium in political as well as in military matters was nothing but a vassal state of England. The indignation which England today is putting up before the world because of Germany's so-called breach of neutrality is made altogether meaningless and unjust by those documents.

When on account of our operations at the coast the English and French press remarked sneeringly that we were not sufficiently instructed about the dangers of the inundation district in the so-called "Polderland" they were right in so far as before the beginning of the war we did not know Belgian territorial conditions any better than may be learned from sources obtainable in the book market.

The English reconnoitering reports and the excellent maps, therefore, were very valuable booty for us. We were able to make immediate use of this remarkable material and thus could fight England with her own weapons. That should be the best indication of the importance of our enemies' painstaking labor.







(From the North German Gazette of December 15, 1914)


New and convincing evidence with reference to the Anglo-Belgian complicity has been found. Some time ago there was detained in Brussels the British Secretary of Legation, Grant-Watson, who had remained in the British Legaton after the office had been transferred to Antwerp and later on to Havre. This Grant-Watson has been caught in the act of disposing of a number of documents which he at the time of his detention had taken with him from the Legation.

An investigation of these documents showed that they were of the most intimate kind, containing exact information, of the years 1913 and 1914, about the Belgian mobilization plans and about the defense of Antwerp. Among them were also found circular decrees directed to the higher Belgian commands, with fac-simile signatures of the Belgian Minister of War and the Belgian General Staff. Furthermore, a report of a session of the "commission for the provisions base at Antwerp" of May 27, 1913, was found.

The fact that these documents had been at the British Legation sufficiently proves that the Belgian Government in military matters had no secrets from the British Government and that those two governments had a continuous and most intimate understanding in military matters.






Of especial interest is also a handwritten note which was found with the papers and for the destruction of which the British Secretary was very anxious. It was of the following tenor:



(1) Les officiers frangais ont requ ordre de rejoindre des le 27, apres-midi.

(2) Le meme jour le chef de Gare de Feignies a requ ordre de concentrer vers Maubeuge tous les wagons fermes disponibles en vue de transport de troupes.

Communique par la Brigade de gendarmerie de Frameries.



(1) The French officers have received order to rejoin on the 27th in the afternoon.

(2) The same day the station master at Feignies has received order to concentrate toward Maubeuge all available closed railway cars in view of transport of troops.

Communicated by the brigade de gendarmerie at Frameries.


It is of interest to note that Feignies is a railway station on the Maubeuge-Mons line, about three kilometers from the Franco-Belgian boundary.

From this note we learn that France as early as July 27 had taken her first mobilization measures and that the English Legation received notice of this fact immediately from the Belgian Government.

If there were any need for further proof of the relations which existed between England and Belgium the material found would be a valuable supplement in that respect.



It shows again that Belgium had abandoned her neutrality in favor of the entente and that she had become an active member of that coalition, which was formed for the purpose of fighting Germany. For England, however, Belgian neutrality meant nothing more than a "scrap of paper," which she appealed to if it were advantageous to her interests and which she ignored if this were more to her purposes. It is plain that the English Government used the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany as a pretext only in order to make the world and the English people believe that her cause for the war was a just one.





(From the North German Gazette of
Dec. 3, 1914)

Belgium's neutrality which England pretended to be shielding is nothing but a mask.

On August 2, at 7 p. m., we informed Brussels that France's plan of campaign, known to us, compelled us, for reasons of self-preservation, to march through Belgium. But the same afternoon already, that is to say before any-thing of that demarche was known and could be known at London, the British Government had pledged its support to France, pledged it unconditionally in case the German fleet attacked the French coast. Not one word was then said of Belgium's neutrality. This fact is established by the declaration of Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons on August 3, which, owing to the difficulties in the transmission of telegrams prevailing at that time, was not known to me in full on August 4—and it is confirmed by the Blue Book, issued by the British Government.

How then can England pretend that she drew the sword because we violated Belgium's neutrality?

How could British statesmen, who accurately knew the past, talk of Belgian neutrality at all?

When on August 4, I referred to the wrong we were doing in marching through Belgium it was not yet known for certain whether in the hour of affliction the Brussels Government would not decide after all to spare the country and to retire to Antwerp under protest. Remembering that, after the occupation of Liege, I addressed renewed offers in that sense to the Belgian Government, at the request of our Army Administration, you will understand that, on August 4, for military reasons, the possibility for such a development had to be kept open under all circumstances.

Even then the guilt of the Belgian Government was apparent from many a sign. I had not yet any positive documentary proofs thereof at my disposal, but the British statesmen were perfectly familiar with those proofs.

The documents which, in the meantime, have been found at Brussels, and which have been given publicity by me, prove and establish in what way and to what degree Belgium had surrendered her neutrality to England.

The whole world is now acquainted with two outstanding facts—first, when, in the night from the 3d to the 4th of August, our troops entered Belgium, they were not on neutral soil, but on the soil of a state that had long abandoned its neutrality; second, England has declared war on us, not for the sake of Belgium's neutrality, which she herself had helped to undermine, but because she believed that, with the co-operation of two great military Powers of the Continent, she could overcome and master us.

Ever since August 2, when she promised armed support



to France, England was no longer neutral but actually in a state of war with us. Her pointing at our violation of Belgium's neutrality, when she declared war on us on August 4, was nothing but a spectacular trick, intended to deceive the English people and foreign neutral countries about her true war motives.

The war plans which England and Belgium had worked out together to the minutest details now being unveiled, the policy of British statesmen is branded in world history, for all time to come!